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Towards a Typology of Corporate Responsibility in
Different Governance Contexts
Anthony Gambino and Naomi Cahn1
Abstract

This paper develops a typology of different country governance contexts, in
which we propose four broad categories of countries in Sub-Saharan Africa. Our analysis
measures the most appropriate methods for helping to create a climate that is receptive to
fostering corporate accountability. Our criteria are based on several different factors,
none of which is determinative: the natural resources of the country; the country’s
dependence on one commodity; the corruption level; the stability and accountability of
the government; the state of civil society; and the existence of ongoing conflict.
Examining these factors together results in measuring not just the country’s receptivity to
change, but also the means for producing change.

At one end of the spectrum, what we label “Category 0” countries, are nations
with economies and governments that are so poorly managed that there is little
multinational investment – sometimes even in the context of lucrative investment
opportunities. At the other end lie those countries with acceptable levels of good
governance, more developed economies and markets, and with, consequently, a
comparatively high level of both domestic and multinational corporate investment. We

1

Tony Gambino was the Mission Director for the United States Agency for International Development in
Kinshasa, Democratic Republic of the Congo, from December 2001-July, 2004. Naomi Cahn is a professor
of law at George Washington University. This paper was presented at the Africa Project Conference of the
GW Institute of International Corporate Governance and Accountability, Oct. 29, 2004.

-1-

examine the appropriateness of strategies to apply external or internal pressure in
different types of countries. Next, we discuss the affects of applying the proposed
intervention strategies to the countries, addressing both short and long-term expected
results. We find that in "Category 0" countries, with extremely low levels of
international investment, strategies should focus on improving governance and overall
human welfare, which often could lead to welcoming international corporate investment.
Other categories of countries, with greater -- and often problematic -- international
corporate involvement, require different types of approaches.

Introduction
The country governance context is critical in deciding on appropriate strategies to
improve corporate responsibility. This paper develops a typology of different governance
contexts, in which we propose four broad categories of countries in Sub-Saharan Africa.
At one end of the spectrum are countries with economies and governments that are so
poorly managed that there is little multinational investment – sometimes even in the
context of lucrative investment opportunities. At the other end lie those countries with
acceptable levels of good governance, more developed economies and markets, and with,
consequently, a comparatively high level of both domestic and multinational corporate
investment. We examine the appropriateness of strategies to apply external or internal
pressure in different types of countries. Next, we discuss the affects of applying the
proposed intervention strategies to the countries, addressing both short and long-term
expected results. The first category of countries, which includes the Democratic
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Republic of the Congo, Liberia, and Sierra Leone, is, in the context of this topic, the least
well understood; therefore, the paper discusses in greater detail the case of one of these,
the Democratic Republic of the Congo (hereafter “DRC”).

Typology

Various entities have developed different means for measuring a country’s growth and
eligibility for investment. The World Bank uses criteria to assess a country’s eligibility
for IDA (International Development Assistance) that focus on per capita income and
creditworthiness for borrowing from both commercial and multilateral institutions and
appropriate performance standards, such as macroeconomic stability and good
governance.2 These criteria are weighed together; for example, a country with a lower per
capita income than the IDA cut-off may nonetheless be ineligible if it is able to secure
commercial and other multilateral loans.3 Although the World Bank uses this
classification for eligibility for loans, grants, and special programs of debt relief, other
institutions also rely on these classifications.4 In sub-Saharan Africa, there are 37
countries that qualify for IDA-status.5

The World Economic Forum uses a growth competitiveness index based on the
quality of the macroeconomic environment, the state of the country’s public institutions,
2

International Development Association, IDA Eligibility, Terms, and Graduation Policies 1-4 (2001)
(avail. at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/IDA/Resources/Seminar%20PDFs/ida%20eligibility.pdf).
3 Id. at 4.
4 Todd Moss, et al., Double-Standards, Debt Treatment, and World Bank Country Classification: The
Case of Nigeria 2 (2004) (avail. at http://www.cgdev.org/Publications/index.cfm?PubID=147).
5 Id. at 3. Nigeria and Zimbabwe, which are not included in that number, are also IDA eligible, but they
occupy a special “blend” status.
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and the level of its technological readiness.6 Finally, the United States recently
established the Millennium Challenge Account to provide development assistance to
countries with good governance practices. Among the 16 criteria for eligibility are civil
liberties, control of corruption, immunization rate, inflation rate, fiscal policy, and trade
policy.7 Among the 16 countries deemed eligible in 2004 were the following subSaharan Africa nations: Ghana, Lesotho, Madagascar, Mali, and Mozambique.8 There
are additional measures that are more focused on governance, such as the World Bank
Institute’s Aggregate Governance Indicators Dataset, and on political and economic risk,
such as the International Country Risk Guide.9

While these measures are useful for background information, in our analysis, we
are measuring a country’s suitability not just for the stability of economic investment nor
eligibility for development assistance. Instead, we are examining the most appropriate
methods for helping to create a climate that is receptive to fostering corporate
accountability, a complex analysis that includes legal, social, economic, and political
variables. Our criteria are based on several different factors, none of which is
determinative: the natural resources of the country; the country’s dependence on one
commodity; the corruption level; the stability and accountability of the government; the
state of civil society; and the existence of ongoing conflict. Examining these factors
together results in measuring not just the country’s receptivity to change, but also the
means for producing change.
6

World Economic Forum, Ernesto Hernandez-Cata, Exec. Summary, in Africa Competitiveness Report 1,
3 (2004), avail. at www.weforum.org/pdf/Glob.pdf.
7 Millennium Challenge Corporation: Reducing Poverty Through Growth, avail. At
www.mca.gov/countries/selection/data/shtml.
8 Eligible Countries, avail. at http://www.mca.gov/countries/eligible/index.shtml.
9 Moss, supra note __, at 12.
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We have divided countries in sub-Saharan Africa into four different categories.10
We call the first category of countries “Category 0,” to denote the near-absence of both
effective governance and significant levels of foreign investment. These countries, such
as Burundi, the DRC, Liberia, and Sierra Leone, have long had weak, highly corrupt
governments, typically have suffered recently from war, and are left today with very low
levels of international investment. Category 0 countries possess extremely ineffective
basic institutions in the areas necessary to establish the prerequisites for corporate
controls of any kind; they lack a reliable legal system, governmental transparency, and
functioning capital markets.11 The law as written and the law as enforced in the courts
differ dramatically.12 Ironically, many of these countries are resource-rich, but they do
not perform as well as some resource-poor countries when it comes to economic, social,
and governance issues.13 A recent Global Witness report notes: “Instability, coupled
with widespread corruption throughout the DRC, is currently a major deterrent to foreign
investment . . . Understandably, many mining companies are unwilling to take the risks
involved in starting operations in the DRC.”14 As a result, notwithstanding the many
opportunities for business investment, there is little external capital, and indigenous
businesses remain relatively small.

10

Although our analysis focuses on sub-Saharan Africa, the categories can be used more globally as well.

11. Id. at 848. The last sentence of the article concludes “[t]hese countries need honest judges and regulators, good disclosure
rules, and the beginnings of a culture of honesty before it makes sense to worry” about other corporate governance issues, such as the
number of independent directors. Id. at 849.
12. This is certainly true in the Congo. Stuart Cohn, Teaching in a Developing Country: Mistakes Made and Lessons Learned in
Uganda, 48 J. Leg. Educ. 101, 104 (1998). In preparing to teach a course on securities markets in Uganda, Professor Cohn discovered
that “[n]othing existed except the laws, a Capital Markets Authority that had no capital markets to regulate, and a stock exchange
devoid of stock.” Id. at 104. His advice to other teachers developing similar courses is not to assume that their students know the law.
In Uganda, for example, copies of relevant statutes were simply not available in the numbers necessary for teaching in the classroom.
Id. at 108.
13. Id. at 1.
14

Global Witness at 8.
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The second category, “Category One,” denotes countries highly dependent on a
single source of export revenue, often oil. Single-source resource dependence provides
increased opportunities for corruption, and oil and mineral exports can have an antidemocratic impact.15

These countries have substantial investments, but in very focused

areas. Category 1 countries, such as Angola, Botswana, Nigeria, and the Republic of
Congo (hereafter “Congo-Brazzaville”), depend overwhelmingly on one major
commodity for their export revenue. Large multinational corporations have risked
substantial amounts of capital in these countries. The commodity may be oil as is true of
Nigeria, Angola, and Congo-Brazzaville16, or, as in the case of Botswana, diamonds.
Aside from Botswana, these countries trend strongly in the direction of corrupt and
highly inefficient governments, but are marginally more stable than Category 0 countries.
Countries that are rich in natural resources provide potentially lucrative
opportunities for private investors and can contribute to a country’s fiscal strength.17
Ironically, many of the most resource-rich countries actually do not perform as well as
resource-poor countries when it comes to economic, social, and governance issues; this is
the so-called “paradox of plenty.”18 Countries that are highly dependent on natural
resource wealth tend to have slower growth rates than other countries.19 Resource
dependence provides increased opportunities for corruption, and oil and mineral exports
(although not others) have an anti-democratic impact.20

15. Id. at 8.
16

In 2001, the latest year for which data are available, the two largest oil exporters in sub-Saharan Africa
were Nigeria, which exported 107,176,000 metric tons, and Angola, which exported 35,089,000 metric
tons; Congo-Brazzaville was the fourth largest exporter, at 12,550 tons. World Bank, African
Development Indicators 2004 90 (2004).
17.
18.
19.
20.

Id.
Id. at 1.
Pegg, supra n. 32, at 8, 12, 13.
Id. at 8.
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This “resource curse,” in which governments are highly dependent on natural
resources, can have a significantly negative impact on governments by: (1) fostering
corruption, as governments receive large amounts of resource revenues; (2) weakening
governments, such as through loss of control over resource-rich territories; and
(3) diminishing accountability, such as governmental use of resource revenues to
cultivate patronage and large security forces.21
Encouraging private sector development and implementing extensive aid
programs do not necessarily result in better governmental accountability, although good
governance is critical for business development and increasing per capita income.22 The
relationship, however, is not rigid; for example, Botswana, which is the largest diamond
exporter in the world and has experienced the highest rate of growth in the world for
twenty of the past thirty-five years, holds elections every five years and has the highest
level of transparency of payments of any country in Africa.23
Our third category encompasses the “Category 2” countries. Examples are
Kenya, Mozambique, Tanzania, and Uganda. These countries are not as poor as the
countries in Category 0, and have a broader range of export commodities than the
countries in Category 1. These countries are characterized by substantial levels of
external investment (when compared to Category 0), and, broadly speaking, governments
that are more interested in decreasing corruption and improving the business
environment.
21. Michael Ross, The Natural Resource Curse: How Wealth Can Make You Poor, in Natural Resources and Violent Conflict:
Options and Actions 17, 24–25 (Ian Bannon & Paul Collier eds., World Bank 2003). And they can also finance rebel movements. See
Winer & Roule, supra n. 70, at 200–202 (discussing how various outside armies in the Congo financed themselves through plundered
resources); U.N. Sec. Council, supra n. 59.
22. See Kaufmann, supra n. 44, at 19 (in countries with “high levels of transparency, effective parliamentary oversight, and high
standards of corporate ethics, there was a higher rate of GDP growth over the previous three years than in countries with lower
standards of transparency, of parliamentary oversight, and corporate ethics”). Other developmental outcomes, such as the literacy rate
and infant mortality, are also positively affected. Id. at 17.
23. Save the Children, Lifting the Resource Curse: Extractive Industry, Children, and Governance 13,
http://www.reliefweb.int/library/documents/2003/scf-drc-17jun.pdf (accessed Dec. 20, 2003).
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Category 3, the final category, includes the best-run countries of Sub-Saharan
Africa, such as South Africa, Ghana, Mali, and Senegal. In these countries, country
governance is much improved and orders of magnitude better than in Category 0
countries, economies are diversified, and levels of foreign investment are already
reasonably high. South Africa, for example, had the highest amount of manufacturing
exports in sub-Saharan Africa, with an annual growth rate of 7-8%.24

Corporate Accountability and Good Governance
The central implications of the typology are that countries in different categories
require different strategies relating to corporate responsibility. A deeper implication is
that the entire strategic approach to corporate responsibility requires unpacking. For
example, it is hard to enhance corporate responsibility in countries with no multinational
corporations! Should those countries in Category 0, then, be put in a category labeled
“hopeless”? How can you have corporate accountability and responsibility in a situation
where there are few corporations and very weak governance? Is the relationship between
corporations and good governance really as insidious as some still assume?
We believe it is a bias to assume that increased international investment by
corporations is in and of itself a bad thing for the country or that corporations prefer poor
governance. In the context of Category 0 countries, these statements are patently untrue.
The existence of a substantial multinational presence could provide the impetus for
change. On the other hand, outside of a few countries where extractive industries provide
such great rewards that they justify the risks (as seen in many category 1 countries),
widespread corruption and inefficient government serve as a disincentive to foreign
24

Africa Development Indicators, supra note __, at 104-105.
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investment.25 When corporations cannot rely on enforcement of contracts, cannot rely on
public bureaucracies, cannot hire literate workers, then they are much less likely to invest
in a country.
There has been a great deal of publicity and activism around issues of “economic
globalization,” a phenomenon which Jagdish Bhagwati thoughtfully describes as
“integration of national economies into the international economy through trade, direct
foreign investment . . . short-term capital flows, international flows of worker and
humanity generally, and flows of technology.”26 Economic globalization is accused of
benefiting multinational corporations over local workers, and increasing the wealth of
foreign investors at the expense of country-internal workers and businesses.27 In a
thoughtful paper, Todd Moss and his colleagues discuss the historical antipathy towards
foreign investment in Africa, and debunk many of the myths.28 While we too recognize
the dangers of globalization, we also believe that foreign investment can improve a
country’s economic, political, and social outlook.
Indeed, it is only within the past decade that international economists have begun
to study the relationship between good governance and a good business environment.29
New research shows that good governance results in improved development, but that
increasing incomes does not, by itself, result in good governance.30

25

See, e.g., infra; Kimberly Ann Elliott, Corruption as an Internal Policy Problem: Overview and
Recommendations 175, 194, in Corruption and the Global Economy (Kimberly Ann Elliott ed. 1997),
26 Jagdish Bhagwati, In Defense of Globalization 3 (2004).
27 See, e.g., The International Forum on Globalization, avail. at http://www.ifg.org/about.htm.
28 Todd J. Moss, Vijaya Ramachandran, and Manju Kedia Shah, Is Africa’s Skepticism of Foreign Capital
Justified? Evidence from East African Firm Survey Data (2004)(avail. at
www.cgdev.org/Publications/?PubID=120.
29. Kaufmann & Kraay, supra n. 46, at 73–75.
30. Kaufmann, supra n. 44, at 17.
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In an exhaustive survey of the relationship between governance and corruption,
World Bank economists used six concepts to measure good governance, including
governmental accountability, political stability, and the quality of government service
delivery, consisting of policy making, the rule of law, and corruption control.31 The Bank
economists found a correlation between good governance and per capita income, but they
also discovered that a higher per capita income does not necessarily result in better
country governance.32 On the other hand, good governance is critical to fostering
sustainable development.33 When executives were asked to list the most important
constraints on their firms’ growth, corruption and ineffective government bureaucracies
were second and third on the list, with only a lack of finance rated as a larger constraint.34
Strategies
Broadly, there are two sets of interrelated strategies that can be used to change the
investment climates to improve governance and improve the climate for international
investment. First, multilateral institutions, bilateral aid agencies, and international
nongovernmental organizations can exert pressure on the national government and other
institutions within a country where they have programs. Second, indigenous nongovernmental organizations, individuals, and responsible governmental officials can
pressure institutions from within the country (often with external support).

31. Id. at 5; Daniel Kaufmann et al., Governance Matters III: Governance Indicators for 1996-2002 3–4,
http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/pdf/govmatters3.pdf (Dec. 20, 2003).
32. Kaufmann, supra n. 44, at 17.
33. World Bank Group, Extractive Industries and Sustainable Development: A Evaluation of World Bank Group Experience vol.
2, 51, http://www.wds.worldbank.org/servlet/ wds_Ibank_Servlet?pcont=details&eid=000160016_20030828164541; select PDF (July
29, 2003) (stating that the bank should focus on strengthening governance prior to expansion).
34. Michaela Wrong, In the Footsteps of Mr. Kurtz, 18 (Harper Collins 2001). This data is drawn from the Executive Opinion
Survey of the World Economic Forum. Id. at 8. The African countries surveyed were: Botswana, Mauritius, Namibia, Nigeria, South
Africa, and Zimbabwe. Many of the countries with high levels of corruption, such as the DRC, were not even included in the survey.
Id.
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There have been four types of efforts to foster corporate responsibility via the
actions of external actors.35 First, there has been legislation specifically directed at
promoting responsibility, including disclosure requirements. For example, the Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act in the United States was enacted to deter US companies from
bribing foreign officials. Second, corporations have adopted voluntary codes of
responsibility.36 These codes may have been developed internally by multilateral
corporations, by industry-based organizations, or by multi-governmental entities, such as
the OECD. Third, as local and international nongovernmental organizations have exerted
more pressure, companies have directly engaged with consumers and NGOs through
meetings, publicity campaigns, or other types of actions.37 Finally, government aid
agencies and multilateral institutions, like the World Bank, have pressured companies
and countries to develop improved accountability.
The most visible efforts have come through this third type of activism. For
example, a group of nongovernmental organizations have launched an initiative, which
has received increasing amounts of attention, to use transparency through the reporting of
resource revenues to hold both the corporation as an entity and the government
accountable for money paid and received.38 The “Publish What You Pay” campaign,
which was officially launched in June of 2002, pushes corporations to disclose all
payments made to governments.39 Publish What You Pay would lead to the release of
information about how much governments are receiving from companies, thereby

35. Id.
36

These codes are discussed by others at the conference. See the papers by McInerney and Murphy.

37. Le Billon, supra n. 3, at 264.
38. Global Witness, Publish What You Pay: An Appeal for Social Responsibility through Financial Transparency Headed by
George Loros and a Coalition and a Coalition of NGOs, http://www.globalwitness.org/campaigns/oil/publish_what_pay.php
(accessed Feb. 13, 2004).
39. For further description of the campaign see Global Witness, http://www.publishwhatyoupay.org (accessed Feb. 13, 2004);
Global Witness, http://www.globalwitness.org (accessed Feb. 13, 2004).
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permitting citizens, corporations, and NGOs to monitor how that money is being spent.40
The campaign is directed at companies, their home governments, and the exporting
countries; the types of payments requiring disclosure would include taxes, fees, royalties,
signing bonuses, and any other money transferred to the federal, state, or local
governments.41 The theory behind this strategy is that, to trace what happens to money
paid to government officials, it is useful to have some idea of how much money they are
actually receiving.42 Improved transparency should help the business environment
improve as companies recognize that government benefits are no longer arbitrarily
granted, and the risks and costs of doing business decrease.43
These non-governmental organization efforts have dovetailed with the first two
sets of reforms (developed country legislation and voluntary codes) because there are a
variety of initiatives that already exist to promote host-country and company reporting,
ranging from an IMF voluntary Code of Good Practices on Fiscal Transparency to OECD
Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises.44 The means for enforcing these obligations
have, so far, been voluntary.45 These efforts are important in all categories except
Category 0.
Finally, the World Bank has imposed conditions on its funding of various
business projects in order to encourage transparency, and has attempted to provide
40. Simon Taylor, Corporate Secrecy Oils the Wheels of Poverty, Intl. Herald Trib. (June 20, 2002).
41. Gary & Karl, supra n. 36, at 79; Global Witness, http://publishwhatyoupay.org/ appeal (accessed Feb. 13, 2004).
42. See id. (explaining the theory behind mandatory disclosure).
43. Id.;
e.g.
Dept.
for
Intl.
Dev.,
Extractive
Industries
Transparency
Initiative,
http://www.dfid.gov.uk/News/News/files/eiti_guide_a.htm (accessed Feb. 13, 2004); Dept. for Intl. Dev., Report of the Extractive
Industries
Transparency
Initiative
(EITI)
Workshop,
11–12
(Feb.
2003),
http://www.dfid.gov.uk/News/News/files/eiti_workshop_report_feb03.pdf (accessed Feb. 13, 2004).
44. Philip Swanson et al., Who Gets the Money? Reporting Resource Revenues in Natural Resources and Violent Conflict:
Options and Actions, 43, 58–75 (Ian Bannon & Paul Collier eds., World Bank 2003).
45. Le Billon, supra n. 3, at 257–258; Swanson, supra n. 149, at 62, 79. In its preliminary review of the Angolan diamond
certification process, the NGO Global Witness suggests the necessity of independent monitoring performed by an unaffiliated entity to
protect the integrity of any control system. Global Witness, Can Controls Work? A Review of the Angolan Diamond Control System?,
http://www.globalwitness.org; select diamonds, select briefing documents, select English version ‘can controls work’ (Dec. 26, 2001).
See also Gereffi et al., supra n. 6, at 60 (pointing out that control systems vary in strength depending on whether they are sponsored by
industry, NGOs, or multilaterals).
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follow-up monitoring throughout the duration of its projects.46

These outside control

efforts are important, and work should be done to make sure that the laws as they stand
are enforced, and that greater openness is supported.
To sustain the corporate responsibility agenda, however, local communities must
feel vested in the process. As the World Bank points out, only when “public sector actors
and stakeholders based in developing countries are accorded a central role” can “an
agenda that remains largely ‘foreign’” become domestic.47 The most critical reforms are
those that increase political participation and accountability and promote competitive
economic develop, but such democratization and economic development do not occur
quickly.48
Category 0
Multinational corporations do not want to work in Category 0 countries. In a
recent study of 107 multinational companies with total revenues of $1.66 trillion,
respondents were asked about the impact of corporate social responsibility on their
investment decisions.49 A majority of the respondents noted that the influence of
corporate social responsibility considerations had increased over the past five years, and
that such concerns had at least as much impact as more traditional considerations – such
as cost – on the decision to undertake new business opportunities. 50 Moreover, a
majority of the extractive industry (mining and oil and gas companies) respondents
reported that they had decided not to begin operations in a new country based on such
46. U.N. Sec. Council, supra n. 66, at 18.
47

Halina Ward, Public Sector Roles in Strengthening Corporate Social Responsibility: Taking Stock 25
(2004)(World Bank).
48 See Elliott, supra note __, at 209, 225.
49 Jonathan E. Berman and Tobias Webb, Race to the Top: Attracting and Enabling Global Sustainable
Business: Business Survey Report (2003)(World Bank website).
50 Id. At 3.
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concerns.51 Rather than looking for opportunities in countries where laws on corporate
social responsibility were weak, 61% of the companies reported that strong laws made it
easier for them to conduct business, and 75% indicated that well-enforced laws also
helped their business.52 Another author notes: "In countries with weak development, it is
costly [for firms] to improve investor protection because the institutional infrastructure is
lacking and good governance has political costs. Further, in such countries, the benefit
from improving governance is weaker because capital markets lack depth." 53
We believe that even in Category 0 countries there are realistic strategies with
positive short-term results leading to improved governance and an improved climate for
international investment. The key issue, clarified by the typology, is that indigenous
actors in Category 0 countries are in desperate need of outside assistance to overcome the
manifold obstacles in their way. Marshalling sophisticated strategies to link outside and
inside actors to improve governance is a critically needed intervention, particularly in
Category 0 countries.
The Case of the Congo: Today, the DRC, a clear example of a Category 0
country, is emerging from a long war.54 The illegal exploitation of the Congo’s natural
resources, including gold, diamonds,55 coltan, cobalt, and timber, helped fuel the war.56
There were virtually no barriers to money-laundering.57 Indeed, the abuses of natural
resources were so egregious that the United Nations issued a special report
51

Id. At 3, 8.
Id. At 19.
53 Craig Doidge, et al., Why Do Countries Matter so Much for Corporate Governance? (Sept. 2004)(avail.
at www.edgi.org/wp).
52

54. See Bergner, supra n. 57 (stating that U.N. “accords have lately brought a tenuous degree of peace”). Although labeled a civil
war, some have labeled the Congolese conflict as the first World War in Africa because of the many neighboring countries which
fought battles on Congolese territory. Marc Laceu, Hope Glimmers as War Retreats from Congo, N.Y. Times A1 (Oct. 21, 2003).
55. U.N. Sec. Council, supra n. 66, at 14–15, 44–46.
56. Jonathan M. Winer & Trifin J. Roule, Follow the Money: The Finance of Illicit Resource Extraction, in Natural Resources
and Violent Conflict: Options and Actions (Ian Bannon & Paul Collier eds., World Book 2003).
57. Id. at 202.
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recommending that twenty-nine companies be subjected to financial restrictions,
including a freezing of assets and a suspension of banking activities.58
Amnesty International published an analysis of mining in southern Congo in its
Fall 2004 magazine. The article paints an accurate, devastating picture of the artisanal
activity that characterizes most mining in the DRC today: “(T)housands of desperate
locals … are digging the radioactive ground for minerals, including cobalt and gold.
With picks and shovels in short supply, some of the Shinkolobwe miners have
improvised, tearing down the metal signs warning of radioactive danger and shaping
them into shovels. … The going rate for the miners is about 1,000 Congolese francs
(about $3) for a 35-pound sack of raw ore.” These miners make a pittance, yet, as
Amnesty reports, a 20-ton truckload “of raw ore fetches about $25,000 on world
markets.” Profits only go up from there. Perhaps the cell phone you are carrying
contains both coltan and cobalt, mined in this fashion in the Congo, and contributing to
very nice profits for various international companies.
Yet Amnesty offers the following analysis in an accompanying box entitled “AI
(Amnesty International) Fights Resource Exploitation”: “International efforts to
investigate and end this bloody commerce have been slow and mostly unsuccessful to
date, due to opposition by the governments and corporations implicated in abuses.” And
then makes the following recommendation for advocacy: “AI continues to call on
governments in Africa and Europe, as well as the United States, to act on U.N. reports
listing corporations engaged in the illegal exploitation of resources and activities that may
contribute to human rights abuses.”

58. U.N. Sec. Council; supra n. 66, at http://www.un.org/docs/journal/asp/ws/asp?m=s/ 2002/1146.
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This approach is misleading for the general reader. Amnesty’s recommendations
relate to other mining activities in regions of the Congo hundreds of miles away from the
mine they discuss in their article. Advocating such actions against the mining activities
actually described in the Amnesty article would be misguided. There are no major
multinational mining companies presently engaged in mining in the southern Congo
province of Katanga. The entry of major multinational mining companies in all
likelihood would lead to substantial improvements in living conditions, in transparency,
and in economic development. International advocacy should urge governments in
Category 0 to improve their transparency and other practices to hasten the investment of
multinationals, not the reverse.
In another recent report on the mineral trade in copper and cobalt in the DRC,
Global Witness documents the conditions under which these minerals are collected in the
southernmost region of the Congo amid widespread corruption and mismanagement.59
For example, under the new Mining Code, companies are required to pay a 1% tax; one
company reported that it was asked to pay this so often that it became a 40% tax.60
Accordingly, Global Witness has developed a series of recommendations issued to the
World Bank and IMF as well as the DRC transitional government that focus on
improving record-keeping and “commit[ting] to making anti-corruption, transparency and
accountability priority areas by publishing the results of systems and finance audits.”61
Such transparency is, of course, critical. Nonetheless, without continuing
internal pressure and oversight, these recommendations are insufficient. Focusing on

59 Global Witness: Rush and Ruin: The Devastating Mineral Trade in Southern Katanga, DRC
(2004)(avail. At globalwitness.org).
60 Id. At 16.
61 Id. At 2.
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what international institutions and national governments can do overlooks the need for
local monitoring and involvement.
There are other examples of looking for “quick fix” recommendations. This
temptation often leads people examining the problems of Category 0 (and other)
countries to suggest that broad internal reforms, such as elections, strengthening the
judiciary, or standing up an anti-corruption commission, by themselves will lead to
marked improvements in governance. For example, President Bush in his fall 2004
address to the United Nations General Assembly said the following: "Because I believe
the advance of liberty is the path to both a safer and better world, today I propose
establishing a Democracy Fund within the United Nations. This is a great calling for this
great organization. The fund would help countries lay the foundations of democracy by
instituting the rule of law and independent courts, a free press, political parties and trade
unions. Money from the fund would also help set up voter precincts and polling places,
and support the work of election monitors. To show our commitment to the new
Democracy Fund, the United States will make an initial contribution.”62
The record suggests that “advancing liberty,” and other worthy goals, is a much
more difficult undertaking. The proposed interventions are not bad, they are insufficient.
Certain actions, such as reforming the judiciary, in countries like the DRC are long-term
and extremely difficult. Furthermore, implementing these long-term reforms depends on
a well-paid civil service, and these essential longer-term strategies will fail if civil
servants are not paid enough. Category 0 countries need additional investment.
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For Bush, ‘the Advance of Liberty is the Path,’ N.Y. Times, Sept. 22, 2004, at A4.
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For Category 0, attacks on multinationals tend to miss the point. As we have
already noted, these companies, in the main, are not even present in countries like the
DRC. We will return to this issue at the conclusion of this paper.

Category 1
For Category 1 countries, effective tools have been developed by multilateral
institutions, corporations themselves, other governments with important relations with
Category 1 countries, and international nongovernmental organizations to pressure both
the governments and the corporations themselves to act more responsibly.63 This is
where the multilateral institutions, NGOs, and other international actors can play a role.64
There is, of course, a perceived, and often real, conflict of interest between the objectives
of multinationals, their host and home governments, the multilaterals, the communities,
and the NGOs. Each has its own goals, and in many sub-Saharan African governments
individuals working in the public sector have their own selfish interests in receiving
payments outside of the official system.
Unlike Category 0 countries, where we believe combined local and international
strategies must be intertwined to gain improvements in basic country governance, in
Category 1 and beyond a variety of more loosely linked strategies, including work to
improve corporate governance, can be effectively employed. As the ongoing oil bribery
investigations in Nigeria illustrate, external legislation, such as the Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act, may at least punish irresponsible corporate actions, even if it does not

63. Le Billon, supra n. 3.
64. This is not to overlook the role that such institutions play in countries with effective governments and low rates of
corruption; however, there is literature addressing these issues already. Supra n. 9.
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entirely deter such actions.65 We do not, however, believe that external actors and actions
should ever be delinked from the realities of the targeted country and society. People
within the country must always be part of any process that looks to enhance governance
and corporate responsibility.
Categories 2 and 3
Category 2 and 3 countries should benefit from approaches similar to those in
Category 1. But given the diversity of corporate involvement and overall level of
development, particularly of some countries in Category 3, broader approaches may be
more effective. Both external and internal pressure on corporations doing business in
these countries is likely to result in the adoption of voluntary codes of conduct. Category
3 countries have themselves undertaken to enact legislation to deter corruption, and have
provided enforcement mechanisms.66 New mechanisms, such as the MCA, may
encourage improved governance and increased transparency.
In these countries, internal institutional reforms can continue their positive
trajectory to promote competition and deter corruption. Such strategies include
reforming the judiciary to ensure independence; increasing incentives for honesty and
transparency in the civil service; use of competitive bidding schemes in government
procurement; and strengthening already existing civil society institutions, such as the
media and non-governmental organizations.67
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E.g., Ken Silverstein, Investigation Widens in Nigeria Oil Case Involving Halliburton, L.A> Times, Oct.
13, 2004, A6 (scheme to bribe Nigerian officials for contract to construct natural gas complex); Justin
Blum, U.S. Oil Firms Entwined In Equatorial Guinea Deals; Riggs Probe Led to SEC Inquiry
onCorruption, Profiteering, Wash. Post, Sept. 7, 2004, E1.
Riggs Probe Led to SEC Inquiry on Corruption, Profiteering
66 South Africa has, for example, enacted its own anti-corruption act modeled on the US Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act. South Africa: Tough Legislation Puts Firms in the Dock, Africa News, July 16, 2004.
67 See Elliott, supra note __, at 225.
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Long-term Strategies
There are certain things that can be done relatively quickly, such as what Michael
Brown and his colleagues from Innovative Resources Management describe in their
paper discussing the DRC,68 in a Category 0 country. These actions involve focusing on
local stakeholders so that they can take ownership and control of the agenda.
Longer-term actions are also required, particularly in Category 0 and 1 countries,
which are the predicate conditions for beginning a conversation about corporate
accountability. Perhaps the most essential actions are those to improve education,
increase literacy rates, and develop an adequately-paid and trained, appropriately-sized
civil service sector. A literate population will not only provide pressure for increased
democratization, by enhancing people’s skills, it better equips them to choose among a
much greater range of employment possibilities. Concomitantly, as a workforce becomes
more skilled and literacy levels rise, international business sees greater opportunities for
investment.69 Furthermore, a population that is able to read can take steps required to
insist on improved governance practices. If people are literate, then they will have access
to other resources and can look outside of their traditional worldviews – if they read a
newspaper, they may be able to see what can be done differently. When taking steps to
increase literacy, it is critical to ensure gender equity. Studies have repeatedly shown that
educated women have fewer children and allocate more money to benefit their children
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Michael Brown, et al., Combating Low-level Corruption on Waterways in the Democratic Republic of
Congo: Approaches from Bandundu and Equateur Provinces, avail. at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=627684.
69 Topic Brief (avail. at http://www1.worldbank.org/education/topicbrief.asp)
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than do similarly educated men. Moreover, educating more women increases economic
growth and generates more skilled workers.70
As an example of how increasing literacy can reduce corruption, consider the
status of education in Uganda. In a survey examining the use of public funds in
education in Uganda, researchers found that between 1991 and 1995 only 13 percent of
the federal government’s allocation for non-wage expenditures actually reached the
schools. Instead, most of the money was being diverted to local government officials (and
other politicians). After the survey information was disseminated publicly, the
government instituted a series of reforms, including publishing the monthly grants to
each primary school in newspapers for all to see and posting school grants awards on the
school wall. Because of the increased information, parents were better able to monitor
how local officials used public funds.71 As a result, the amount of leakage diminished
substantially: by 1999, over 80 percent of allocated fund reached the schools.72 The
study concluded that information dissemination is important in reducing corruption.73
This, of course, is the concept of transparency. It works best when there is a literate
population.
Transparency works as a sealant against the corrosiveness of corruption.
Corruption takes a series of different forms, including bribes to obtain government
services (corruption in administration), as well as corruption in the process of
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Dina Abu-Ghaida and Stephen Klausen, The Economic and Human Development Costs of Missing the Millennium
Development Goal on Gender Equity 10 (2004)(avail. at
http://www1.worldbank.org/education/pdf/MDG_Gender_Equity.pdf).
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Ritva Reinikka and Jakob Svensson, The Power of Information: Evidence from a Newspaper Campaign
to Reduce Capture (2004)(avail. at http://econ.worldbank.org/view.php?type=5&id=34028
72 Ritva Reinikka and Jakob Svensson, Explaining Leakage of Public Funds (2001)(avail. at
http://econ.worldbank.org/view.php?type=5&id=2595).
73 Explaining Leakage, supra note __, at 29.
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promulgating rules (corruption in law-making).74 Although corruption in law-making is
significant in preventing change in a country’s governance structure and in maintaining
the dominance of the existing elite, bribing government officials to obtain precious
government access is the largest area of corruption in developing countries.75 Because
businesses need access to obtain export permits or business licenses, they may feel
coerced into bribing the appropriate official.76 Additionally, in many developing
countries where civil service positions are poorly (if at all) compensated jobs,
government employees may feel justified in accepting bribes for their services.77 While
the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act and the Organization for Economic Cooperation
and Development (OECD) Convention, together with other programs, attempt to prevent
corruption and bribery,78 they are not effective in many countries.79
Civil servants also must receive adequate salaries on time. Particularly in
Category 0, 1, and 2 countries, poorly-trained, ill-paid, unmotivated civil servants stuck
in an inefficient, overstuffed public sector impede efforts towards improved governance.
Efforts around the margins in countries where this overriding problem is not addressed
are destined to be ineffective. Building a civil service system based on impartiality and
transparency, where public employees depend on the state rather than the illegal
74. See Daniel Kaufmann & Aart Kraay, Growth Without Governance, 3 Economia 169 (Fall 2002),
http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/pubs/growthgov.htm (accessed Jan. 2, 2004); Joel Hellman et al., Measuring Governance,
Corruption, and State Capture: How Firms and Bureaucrats Shape the Business Environment in Transition Economies
http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/pdf/measure.pdf (Apr. 2000) (identifying state capture as a significant issue to be
confronted by transitional economies). Kaufmann and Kraay found that firms that engage in this form of illicit influence did in fact
experience higher growth rates than firms that did not engage in this form of influence.. Id.; A third form of corruption is “influence,”
which, like state capture, allows private individuals to help shape public laws. Amanda J. Pery, The Relationship between Legal
Systems and Economic Development: Integrating Economic and Cultural Approaches, 29 J.L. & Socy. 282, 306 (2002). Influence
depends on the size of the firm and interactions with state officials, rather than direct payments. Id.
75. Saladin Al-Jurf, Good Governance and Transparency: Their Impact on Development, 9 Transnatl. L. & Contemporary
Problems 193, 198–199 (1999).
76. Id. at 199.
77. Id. Al-Jurf lists other circumstances that are conducive to bribery, including the amount of discretion that civil servants are
able to exercise, a legal system that fails to punish bribery, and private companies that are willing to pay the costs of doing business.
Id. at 199-200.
78. Thomas W. Dunfee & David Hess, Getting from Salbu to the “Tipping Point”: The Role of Corporate Action within a
Portfolio of Anti-Corruption Strategies, 21 Nw. J. Intl. L. & Bus. 471, 472–473 (2001).
79. Id. at 472 (noting that the same circumstances that apply to the FCPA apply to the OECD convention, namely the
questionable effectiveness of a western legal theory in non-western countries).
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payments of private companies for their salaries, creates a better business environment
and provides reassurance to civil society actors.

Conclusion
Actions to improve good governance can be taken in all categories of countries.
But actions to improve corporate responsibility are poorly targeted when focused on
Category 0 countries. Our proposed typology leads us to suggest that Category 0
countries require a radically different approach than those in Category 1. People
interested in more justice and improvements in human well-being through improved
corporate governance, should focus on the approaches discussed above in Category 0
countries. When successful, these approaches will lead to greater involvement of
international business, which should be a positive development, under the scenario
outlined in this paper.
More traditional approaches, such as external pressure through a variety of means
on multinational businesses, can have a positive effect in Category 1-3 countries.
Category 1 countries seem the most ripe for targeted efforts by international actors to
obtain improvements in local conditions through enhanced multinational corporate
responsibility. While Categories 2 and 3 will also improve through such efforts, and the
pressure must be sustained, they are already, in general, far more receptive to both
domestic and international efforts to promote corporate accountability, and such efforts
have already begun to yield encouraging results.
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